17.7.06

Perché è il momento di bombardare la Siria

Non lo dico io. Lo dice Micheal Oren, il grande storico della guerra dei sei giorni.

[..] Back in 1966, Israel recoiled from attacking Syria and instead raided Jordan, inadvertently setting off a concatenation of events culminating in war. Israel is once again refraining from an entanglement with Hezbollah’s Syrian sponsors, perhaps because it fears a clash with Iran. And just as Israel’s failure to punish the patron of terror in 1967 ultimately triggered a far greater crisis, so too today, by hesitating to retaliate against Syria, Israel risks turning what began as a border skirmish into a potentially more devastating confrontation. Israel may hammer Lebanon into submission and it may deal Hezbollah a crushing blow, but as long as Syria remains hors de combat there is no way that Israel can effect a permanent change in Lebanon’s political labyrinth and ensure an enduring ceasefire in the north. On the contrary, convinced that Israel is unwilling to confront them, the Syrians may continue to escalate tensions, pressing them toward the crisis point. The result could be an all-out war with Syria as well as Iran and severe political upheaval in Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf.

The answer lies in delivering an unequivocal blow to Syrian ground forces deployed near the Lebanese border. By eliminating 500 Syrian tanks–tanks that Syrian President Bashar Al Assad needs to preserve his regime–Israel could signal its refusal to return to the status quo in Lebanon. Supporting Hezbollah carries a prohibitive price, the action would say. Of course, Syria could respond with missile attacks against Israeli cities, but given the dilapidated state of Syria’s army, the chances are greater that Assad will simply internalize the message. Presented with a choice between saving Hezbollah and staying alive, Syria’s dictator will probably choose the latter. And the message of Israel’s determination will also be received in Tehran.

Any course of military action carries risks, especially in the unpredictable Middle East. But if the past is any guide, and if the Six Day War presents a paradigm of an unwanted war that might have been averted with an early, well-placed strike at Syria, then Israel’s current strategy in Lebanon deserves to be rethought. If Syria escapes unscathed and Iran undeterred, Israel will remain insecure.


Michael B. Oren is a senior fellow at The Shalem Center in Jerusalem and the author most recently of Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford University Press).

4 commenti:

aa ha detto...

mah... ho letto il libro di Oren ed e' molto ben fatto sebbene talvolta dia adito ad alcuni sospetti (in alcuni passaggi chiave e' molto impreciso e il dubbio che mi venne e' che non fosse proprio infallibile).

Cio' detto, mi sembra che la sua logica non regga. Lui dice: attacchiamo la Siria. Benissimo. C'e' un problema: l'Iran sta a guardare? No. A quel punto pero' tutto si ferma perche' gli USA non permetteranno mai una grande guerra in Medio Oriente. Allora bisogna pensare ad un'altra strada.

ciao, aa.

ps: vedo che il tuo blog e' molto ben aggiornato, complimenti. Se te lo sei perso, ti segnalo questo:

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060714_lebanese_security.pdf

Ainpospiò ha detto...

bellissimo, grazie per averlo trovato!
Mi sono permesso di tradurlo e pubblicarlo, spero tu non te ne abbia a male :-)
http://ainpospio.splinder.com/post/8710739/Michael+Oren+sulla+situazione+attuale+in+M.O.
Continua così!

Anonimo ha detto...

cmq, un commento simile lo trovi qui:

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2487

ciao, aa.

Tonibaruch ha detto...

aa:
Mah guarda, non è che io sia convinto di quello che dice Oren, eh. Penso che la cosa migliore -per ora- è che Hezbollah se ne stia solo sotto le bombe. Speriamo che servano, almeno.

ainpospiò:
Grazie