Di editoriali ed analisi pronte a sposare la visione di "vittoria" Nasrallah se ne sono letti a dozzine.
Come ho detto nelle prime ore successive alla fine del conflitto, la oggettiva realtà delle cose sul terreno dice secondo me cose diverse.
Mi fa piacere vedere che il terreno parla diversamente anche secondo altri, quindi ho deciso di raccogliere in questo post un giro di orizzonte delle principali analisi rinvenute sui giornali, secondo cui Hezbollah vede decisamente peggiorate le sue posizioni dopo la guerra. Non solo militarmente, ma anche politicamente. E per il lettore occasionale di giornali, incredibilmente anche all'interno della comunità sciita libanese.
Amit Taheri (Wall Street Journal)
HEZBOLLAH DIDN'T WIN
Hezbollah is also criticized from within the Lebanese Shiite community, which accounts for some 40% of the population. Sayyed Ali al-Amin, the grand old man of Lebanese Shiism, has broken years of silence to criticize Hezbollah for provoking the war, and called for its disarmament. In an interview granted to the Beirut An-Nahar, he rejected the claim that Hezbollah represented the whole of the Shiite community. "I don't believe Hezbollah asked the Shiite community what they thought about [starting the] war," Mr. al-Amin said. "The fact that the masses [of Shiites] fled from the south is proof that they rejected the war. The Shiite community never gave anyone the right to wage war in its name."
There were even sharper attacks. Mona Fayed, a prominent Shiite academic in Beirut, wrote an article also published by An-Nahar last week. She asks: Who is a Shiite in Lebanon today? She provides a sarcastic answer: A Shiite is he who takes his instructions from Iran, terrorizes fellow believers into silence, and leads the nation into catastrophe without consulting anyone. Another academic, Zubair Abboud, writing in Elaph, a popular Arabic-language online newspaper, attacks Hezbollah as "one of the worst things to happen to Arabs in a long time." He accuses Mr. Nasrallah of risking Lebanon's existence in the service of Iran's regional ambitions.
Before he provoked the war, Mr. Nasrallah faced growing criticism not only from the Shiite community, but also from within Hezbollah. Some in the political wing expressed dissatisfaction with his overreliance on the movement's military and security apparatus. Speaking on condition of anonymity, they described Mr. Nasrallah's style as "Stalinist" and pointed to the fact that the party's leadership council (shura) has not held a full session in five years. Mr. Nasrallah took all the major decisions after clearing them with his Iranian and Syrian contacts, and made sure that, on official visits to Tehran, he alone would meet Iran's "Supreme Guide," Ali Khamenei.
Charles Krauthammer (Washington Post)
Even more important is the shift once again in the internal Lebanese balance of power. With Nasrallah weakened, the other major factions are closing in around him. Even his major Christian ally, Michel Aoun, has called for Hezbollah's disarmament. The March 14 democratic movement has regained the upper hand and, with outside help, could marginalize Hezbollah.
In a country this weak, outsiders can be decisive. A strong European presence in the south, serious U.S. training and equipment for the Lebanese army, and relentless pressure at the United Nations can tip the balance. We should be especially aggressive at the United Nations in pursuing the investigation of Syria for the murder of Rafiq Hariri and in implementing resolutions mandating the disarmament of Hezbollah.
It was just 18 months ago that the democrats of the March 14 movement expelled Syria from Lebanon and rose to power, marking the apogee of the U.S. democratization project in the region. Nasrallah's temporary rise during the just-finished war marked that project's nadir. Nasrallah's crowing added to the general despair in Washington about a rising "Shiite crescent" stretching from Tehran to Beirut.
Daily Star (Libano)
So now Nasrallah has a mounting debt owed the Iranians and little room to tell them that he cannot implement a request to heat Israel’s northern border if the nuclear issue demands it. Worse, the Hizbullah leader knows that even a devotee like President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will have to explain to his own poor electors why billions of dollars are being spent on building Shiite homes in Lebanon, while Iranians continue to face grinding poverty - poverty that might get worse if the UN Security Council manages to impose sanctions. How much can the Iranian regime bear financially when it comes to buoying up Nasrallah’s base? Even Shiite businessmen, whether in the Gulf or Lebanon, may hesitate to offer substantial funding if they sense a new war is looming.
What can Nasrallah do if Iran asks Hizbullah to resume military operations against Israel while Shiites are slowly rebuilding their lives? By refusing, Nasrallah could lose his sponsor and financier; by agreeing, he could lose his supporters. If one had to guess, the Hizbullah leader would obey Iran and hope for the best when it comes to the Shiites. Yet the risks of such a
strategy are immense, because Nasrallah’s allegiances would be there for all to see, particularly his coreligionists. And that’s not mentioning how negatively Hizbullah’s actions would be received by the other Lebanese communities, who would again see their country devastated in a proxy war.
Hizbullah has lost what little it once retained of the consensus behind the “resistance” (prompting Nasrallah to threaten his critics on Al-Jazeera last month), but a renewal of conflict, fed by Iran, could lead toward a more violent domestic standoff.
Edward Luttwack (riportato da Liberali per Israele)
IL RISULTATO DELLA GUERRA E' MIGLIORE DI QUANTO SEMBRI
Va riconosciuto a Hezbollah che ha saputo distribuire i suoi missili in villaggi sufficientemente ben nascosti dagli attacchi aerei, mettendoli al riparo dall’artiglieria e dai veicoli aerei automatici. Ma anche che non ha saputo lanciarli in modo efficace, ad esempio in attacchi simultanei contro gli stessi obiettivi.
Al posto di centinaia di morti civili, gli israeliani hanno perso dunque una o due persone al giorno, e anche dopo tre settimane, il totale complessivo è stato inferiore di quanto si sarebbe verificato con un solo attacco suicida. Ciò ha reso inoltre politicamente inaccettabile il lancio di offensive pianificate che avrebbero ucciso giovani soldati e i padri di famiglia; del resto non sarebbe servito in ogni caso a sradicare Hezbollah, perchè non si tratta di un’armata o di un commando di uomini armati, ma di un movimento politico armato.
Per queste diverse ragioni, il risultato della guerra può considerarsi più soddisfacente di quanto non sembri adesso. Hassan Nasrallah non è un altro Arafat, che combatteva per una Palestina in senso «eterno», e non per i palestinesi che abitavano il paese al momento, la cui prosperità e sicurezza egli sempre sacrificò all’altare della causa. Nasrallah ha una circoscrizione politica che intende trovare il proprio centro nel Sud del Libano. Accettando implicitamente la responsabilità di aver cominciato la guerra, Hassan Nasrallah ha diretto i suoi Hezbollah a convergere nella rapida ricostruzione dei villaggi e delle città, proprio al confine israeliano. Ora egli non può cominciare un altro giro di combattimenti che andrebbero a distruggere tutto un’altra volta. Un ulteriore e inaspettato risultato di questa guerra è che la base di potere di Nasrallah nel Sud del Libano è adesso ostaggio del buon comportamento degli Hezbollah.
Al Nahar: fratture nel mondo sciita libanese
Altri editoriali arabi tradotti da MEMRI (note in fondo)
Ahmad Jarallah, editor of the Kuwaiti dailies Al-Siyassa and the
English-language Arab Times, which consistently take a stand against Syria and
Iran, wrote in an editorial in the Arab Times:(6) "The destruction of Lebanon
can never be described as a victory for Hizbullah. After the issuance of U.N.
resolution 1701, no one has the right to claim victory or play with words to
change their meanings. Once again we Arabs have been defeated in Lebanon. The
responsibility for the destruction of Lebanon and for playing with its future
rests with a segment of the Lebanese [people], which is serving the interests
and greed of Iran… Unfortunately Syria and Iran view the U.N. resolution as
biased. This means [that] our dream of seeing a stable Lebanon is still so far
from coming true…
"In this situation, there is no sense in talking about victory. Syria's claim
that the U.N. resolution doesn’t reflect the magnitude of Hizbullah’s victory is
farcical. Syria cannot claim victory, since it didn’t officially fight this war
– unless Damascus thinks that Hizbullah has been fighting its war. If this is
the case, it must be denounced in no uncertain terms."
Columnist Muhammad Al-Seif wrote in the Saudi daily Al-Iqtisadiyya: "The war
currently being waged in Lebanon has shown that many of our Arab intellectuals
have a serious problem [in defining] the criteria for victory and defeat. Some
of them are still convinced that Hizbullah, despite its losses, has brought a
humiliating defeat upon Israel and has shattered the myth of Israel as an
"The problem repeats itself, in the exact same form, in every war fought by the
Arabs. The criterion for victory is [as follows]: As long as the emblem, or the
heroic commander, still lives, [the outcome is pronounced to be] a victory –
regardless of the consequences of the war for the peoples [in terms of damage
to] property and loss of lives and capabilities. Former Egyptian president Gamal
'Abd Al-Nasser led the Arabs to a crushing defeat in 1967, but some of us did
not perceive it as such... Despite this defeat, 'Abd Al-Nasser retained [his
status] as an Arab symbol and [his image as] an undefeatable Arab leader...
"I do not think that Hizbullah gained any victory at all. Lebanon, rather than
Hizbullah, suffered losses whose price will be paid by the Lebanese [people]."(8)
Qeinan Al-Ghamdi, former editor of the Saudi daily Al-Watan, wrote: "[Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert announced that the ceasefire was a diplomatic
victory [for Israel], and that he and his government were about to enter a
difficult [process of] self-examination, which would be carried out at all
levels of the Israeli society. At the same time, Hassan Nasrallah announced a
historic and strategic victory. [This victory was achieved] at the expense of
Lebanon's territory and people, whose only crime is [living in a land that is
used] by other [forces] as an arena for score-settling and pretentious
"[Syrian President Bashar] Assad, for his part, was not content with this
intoxicating 'strategic and historic victory,' which he achieved single-handedly
from the very first day of the war... The intoxication of victory led him to
open additional, verbal, fronts vis-à-vis other Arab regimes that the war had
'exposed.' Having achieved his 'historic victory' against the historical enemy
[i.e. Israel], and having expelled the enemy and liberated the [occupied]
territories, he decided to turn to his treasonous brothers, in order to educate
them and teach them the meaning of 'honor' and 'resistance,' and the 'language
of the powerful.' He should have also added the 'language of the dinosaurs' and
[the concept] of profiteering at the expense of the masses.
"That is the difference [between Israel and the Arabs]. Israel sees reality [as
it is] and assesses the data and the opportunities sensibly, while the Arabs
market illusions, sanctify heroic lies and foster hostility in order to cover up
scandals that can no loner be concealed."(9)
*The Lebanese are Refusing to Admit Defeat in Order to Avoid Responsibility
In an article titled "Who Will Pay the Price of Defeat," 'Abd Al-Rahman
Al-Rashed wrote in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: "In our region, [whenever] anyone manages
to be defeated, [people] carry him around on their shoulders and shower him with
wishes of longevity. No one, without exception, [ever] pays the price. What
happened in Lebanon was an enormous tragedy, whether we label it 'victory,'
'defeat,' or 'steadfastness.' [But] I do not imagine that anyone will be held
accountable. On the contrary, [the one responsible] will get to impose his rule
by using his propaganda machine to justify his actions, saying that what
happened prevented something worse [from occurring]. [The problem is that] the
people have no part in starting or stopping wars. Nobody asks them... In short,
the opinion of millions of people carries no weight, even when their lives and
the lives of their children are at risk.
"Everyone in Lebanon has promised that, after the war, there will be a rigorous
investigation – but these are empty words since no one will [actually] lose his
position. Hassan Nasrallah will not resign since he is head of a party that does
not hold elections; [Lebanese Prime Minister] Fuad Siniora will not resign
[either], since he had no role in [making the decisions concerning] war and
peace. The government will not resign since it does not want to acknowledge
defeat, and even if it does acknowledge [defeat] it will not agree to take
responsibility for Hizbullah's adventures. The worst thing of all is that nobody
[is willing] to call it a defeat, not to mention take responsibility [for it]."(10)
In an article titled "Arab Investigation Committee to Investigate the Lebanon
Crisis," 'Abd Al-Mun'im Sa'id, director of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and
Strategic Research, wrote in the Egyptian government daily Al-Ahram: "Israel was
the only side that immediately set out to investigate what happened in [this]
crisis and war. [Israeli Prime Minister] Ehud Olmert acknowledged that Israel's
performance had been unsatisfactory, and Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz
appointed a committee to investigate the performance of the Israeli military.
The press and public in Israel were not silent [either], but criticized the
performance of the government and army. The entire Israeli society moved from a
state of solidarity to [a process of] investigation and questioning...
"Therefore, [we too] must form an Arab investigation committee, official or
unofficial, that will investigate the crisis and the war, as Israel is doing.
[The investigation] will raise questions regarding everything that happened
during the war, from beginning to end. The first issue might be the decision [to
start] the war. Nasrallah said at the beginning of the war that his party will
be the spearhead of the Arab and Muslim nation in liberating Palestine. Who
appointed him to this role?... Even if we accept [the claim] that Hizbullah is
permanently empowered by the Lebanese government to continue the resistance
until the Shab'a Farms are liberated, [we can still ask whether] Hassan
Nasrallah assessed the situation correctly when he decided to kidnap the Israeli
"It has [also] been proven that Hizbullah... did nothing to prepare the
[Lebanese] home front [for the war]. When asked about this, [Hizbullah] replied
that this is the responsibility of the Lebanese state, i.e. of the side which
was the last to know about the [impending] war, as [Lebanese Prime Minister]
Fuad Siniora said...
"Many questions [also] arise as to [Hizbullah's] military performance, such as
why it did not fire its Zilzal, Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 missiles, which it [promised]
to fire in retaliation if Beirut was attacked. After all, the Lebanese capital
was attacked repeatedly, especially the southern neighborhood where 'Hizbullah
state' is located.
"[And] the most important question of all is why the rockets used by Hizbullah
were of such limited effectiveness that some 30 rockets had to be fired for
every Israeli victim ([some of these victims] being Arabs). This ratio makes the
war very expensive, and [we] should consider equipping the rockets with a
mechanism to improve their accuracy..."(11)
In an article published in the Egyptian government daily Al-Ahram, columnist
Hazem 'Abd Al-Rahman discussed the significance of the demand to disarm
Hizbullah: "It is clearly understood from Resolution  that there can be no
acceptance of an armed organization which is more powerful than the state's
armed forces. [The resolution also clarifies] that the international community
refuses to make light [of the fact] that the leader of this organization usurps
the state's [authority to make] decisions regarding war and peace... The most
dangerous thing about the Hizbullah model is that it conveys the message that
armed and secret militias, which [operate] outside the [official] frameworks of
the state, are the solution. [According to this approach,] any political party
or organization which is displeased with the state's policy must [simply] form a
militia and buy weapons – from arms smugglers, from some evil country, or from a
country that wants to use [this militia] to achieve its aims. Political parties
thus forsake their basic duty of conducting political activity... and their goal
becomes to stockpile weapons and to annihilate their political opponents and
[anyone else who] disagrees with them."(14)
(1) Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 14, 2006.
(2)Al-Yawm (Saudi Arabia), August 15, 2006.
(3)Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 13, 2006.
(4)Al-Rai (Jordan), August 17, 2006.
(5)Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 13, 2006.
(6) These excerpts are from an English translation of the editorial on the Arab
http://www.arabtimesonline.com/arabtimes/opinion/view.asp?msgID=1276, August 14,
(7) Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), August 14, 2006.
(8)Al-Iqtisadiyya (Saudi Arabia), August 14, 2006.
(9)Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), August 16, 2006.
(10)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 14, 2006.
(11)Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 21, 2006.
(12)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 16, 2006.
(13)Al-Gumhuriyya (Egypt), August 14, 2006.
(14)Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 13, 2006.
(15)Al-Hayat (London) August 20, 2006.